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Abstract:
This paper presents a model of competitive bidding that explicitly
parameterizes how the expected price paid by each bidder depends on
other bidders' information. Varying this parameter, yields a family of
auction mechanisms—a family we call regret-free because no bidder
would ever want to have bid differently even if he had known, at the
time of bidding, all the information on which his payments would be
based. This family includes many, if not most, auction mechanisms
observed in practice; the family excludes many mechanisms suggested by
the literature as good mechanisms , but rarely if ever used in practice.
The model not only defines an interesting class of mechanisms, but
also allows for the simultaneous study of all mechanisms within the
class. To illustrate, by solving a single direct revelation game,
Theorem 1 explicitly characterizes the bidders' expected payments as a
function of the model's parameters. By varying the parameters in this
solution, Theorem 2 unifies a variety of results on the role of infor-
mation previously obtained through a variety of mechanisms. Together,
these theorems demonstrate the potential of the model in better under-
standing the role of information in auctions.

Introduction
Thousands of years ago, the Babylonians gathered annually for an
aucton of marriagable maidens. The auctioneer sold each damsel to the
prospective bridegroom offering to pay the most, or, in the case of
less attractive damsels, the man demanded the smallest additional
marriage-portion in order to wed her. Since then, few things have
escaped ever being sold to the highest bidder. Today, the combined
value of all the automobiles, houses, horses, farm machinery, flowers,
tobacco, antiques, paintings, financial instruments, miscellaneous
junk, contracts of all types, and—well, you name it!—auctioned in a
single day typically runs to many billions of dollars.
The prevalence of auctions may stem from the relatively passive
role assigned to the seller. He need merely offer an item for sale;
competitive bidding can do the rest. No matter whether the bidding
involves sealed envelopes containing slips of paper stating the amount
being offered for a mineral lease, or voluminous written proposals
detailing the development of a new defense system, or a chattering
auctioneer cajoling his audience into making ever larger offers for a
piece of used farm equipment, or a silent clock quickly ticking down
the asking price for a lot of cut flowers, the bidding determines not
only who wins what, but also who pays whom how much.
Cassady (1967) describes a myriad of bidding systems. The Stark
and Rothkopf (1979) bibliography lists almost 500 works studying
various aspects of competitive bidding. Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1980)
surveys a broad varietv of auction and bidding models. Almost without
exception, auctions sell each item, if sold at all, to the bidder
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offering the most or demanding the least. Then are all auctions fun-
damentally the same?
No! What a bidder learns from others' bidding may vary from auc-
tion to auction. For example, in a sealed bid auction, a bidder
learns nothing about, and can therefore deduce nothing from, others'
bids until after all bids have been submitted. On the other hand, in
a progressive oral auction, a bidder might observe when others drop
out of the bidding, and thereby infer something about their infor-
mation. This additional information may cause the bidder to revise
his own estimate of the item's value and, consequently, bid differ-
ently than he would have without the additional information. Thus,
the expected amount of the winning bid in an oral auction may differ
from that in a sealed bid auction.
What a bidder learns about his own value in the process of bidding
depends not only on what the bidding process reveals about others'
information, but also on how others' information relates to his own
value. In some cases, a bidder's expected value for an item, con-
ditional on whatever he knows before the bidding starts, is independ-
ent of whatever everyone else knows. Then, no matter what the bidding
system, others' bidding could have no effect on a bidder's own value
estimate. In this case, we might expect that the expected price of
the item be independent of the bidding system. Indeed, Vickrey (1961)
characterizes equilibrium bidding by risk neutral bidders with inde-
pendent values for two specific types of auctions; both types result
in the same expected equilibrium price for the item. Myerson (1981)
shows that, in general for risk neutral bidders with independent
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values, the expected price depends only on who wins it; for example,
the expected price of the item will be independent of the bidding
system so long as the item always goes to the bidder who values it
most highly.
When a bidder's expected value for the item varies with others'
value estimates, then how much a bidder learns about his own value
from others' bids might well depend on the type of auction. Indeed,
Milgrom and Weber (1982) characterize equilibrium bidding, by risk,
neutral bidders with quite general dependent value estimates, for
three specific types of auctions. Roughly speaking, the more infor-
mation about his own value a bidder can discover during the bidding,
the higher the auction's expected equilibrium price for the item. We
generalize this monotonicity of price in information to a broad family
of auctions.
The body of this paper consists of four sections. We start by
presenting our model and its notation. The model parameterizes auc-
tions by the minimal statistic through which the expected price paid by
each risk neutral bidder depends on other bidders' information. Next,
we define regret-free auction mechanisms. Roughly speaking, an auction
with risk neutral bidders is regret-free if at equilibrium, no bidder
could have gained by having had, at the time of bidding, all the infor-
mation on which his payment depends. Thereafter, we consider only
regret-free mechanisms; while we do not delineate conditions leading to
regret-free mechanisms, the sealed bid auction, the progressive auc-
tion, and the button auction of Milgrom and Weber will clearly each be
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regret-free in suitably regular models. Thus, the model in itself
defines an interesting class of auction mechanisms.
The remaining two sections illustrate that this model also has
great potential in better understanding the role of information in auc-
tions. In particular, the third section derives an expression for the
expected amount paid by each bidder in a regret-free mechanism as a
function of all his information and the statistic through which his
expected price may depend on other bidders' information. The final
section defines when the information used by one auction is a refine-
ment of the information used by another, and presents quite weak con-
ditions under which the expected amount paid by each bidder increases
monotonically with the refinement of the information.
Notation:
The subscripts i, j, and k range from one to n and denote bidders;
the subscript zero denotes the bid taker. Before the bidding starts,
each bidder privately observes a signal s. from an arbitrary probabil-
ity space. We assume that the outcome of the auction depends on each
s. only through some real valued "rating" function a.(s.); in other
words, each bidder's pre-bidding information may be summarized by a
single number a.. Hereafter, we suppress the underlying s.'s and deal
directly with the resulting a 's.
Now looking at the bid taker, let a be a constant, later
interpreted as the reservation price or screening level of the bid
taker. We capture the effect of an uncertain screening level by
adding a phantom bidder j with the uncertain level as his a.. We
incorporate any information, possibly multi-dimensional, observed by
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the bid taker after choosing the auction mechanism, but before the
bidding starts, by adding an appropriate number of phantom bidders j,
with the a.'s chosen to reflect the bid taker's information and scaled
J
so that they will be less than a with probability one.
To simplify later expressions, let Cf - denote the vector (a.. , a~,
.... a. .,, a. .,, .... a ); for i different from k, let a . . denote a1 1-1' i+l' ' n ' ~i»k
similar vector, but with both a. and a, removed. The limit "a . < a"
' l k -l —
on an integral means "a : a. [ a V j * 0, i;" similarly, "a . , \ a"
i j —i
,
k —
means "a : a . <^ a ¥ j * 0, i, k. " Finally, let a*, denote the maximum
a., j = 0, 1, ..., i_l, i+l, •••» n.
Our model differs from previous models in its explicit parameteri-
zation of how the expected price paid by each bidder may depend on the
information held by other bidders. Let r. (o_.) be an arbitrary func-
tion of a.
,
and let r. denote any specific value of the function.
Interpret r. as minimal statistic of a_. through which the expected
price paid by i may depend on c_..
The function r.(a_ ) may take many forms. For a sealed bid first
price auction, the function might be a constant, thus containing no
information about cr_. ; in a sealed bid second price auction, r. equals
a*. The two special cases of r.(a .) = a* and r.(a .) = a . correspondi l -l i l -l -l
to two extreme types of progressive oral auctions. More generally,
r.(cr_.) may give upper and lower bounds (possibly infinite) on each
component of cr_.. The statistic r. might even be a subjective prob-
ability distribution of a. , where the distribution itself varies with
a .
.
-l
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Determining the functional form of r.(a ) corresponding to any
specific auction may be very difficult. Indeed, the form may well
depend on the bidding strategies used by the bidders. However, we
need not worry about determining the specific form of the function; we
only need that each specific auction (the description of which in-
cludes a description of bidders' strategies) may be characterized by
some form of r.(a .) function.
1 -l
To complete the description of the information, let F.
_.
(a_. \o ,r
.
)
denote the cumulative distribution of a . conditional on a. and r..
-l 11
This distribution implies conditional distributions
^-i.k^-i.k'VVV and F i >k (0klV r i> of a-i,k and of V (We
consistently abuse notation by using the same symbol for both a random
variable and for its realization.) For simplicity, we assume that
F.
,
(a |a.,r. ) is dif ferentiable with respect to a, at a, equal to
a. for almost all a. given r.. Roughly speaking, this means zero prob-
ability of tied a.'s; more precisely, for any r. there is a zero prob-
ability of i seeing a a. such that there is a positive probability of
another bidder j having a. equal to a
.
. Without this assumption, our
derivations would be complicated by the possible need to employ the
techniques developed by Engelbrecht-Wiggans , Milgrom and Weber (1983)
to handle cases with positive probability of tied a.'s.
A bidder's utility for any particular outcome of an auction
depends on the value and price of the item. Let v.(a ,a_„) be a real
valued function of a. and a_ . This function may be interpreted as
the value to i of the item given specific values for each a.. Also,
let p.(a.,r.) be a real valued function of a, and r.. This function
l i' l i l
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may be interpreted as the expected amount i will pay (possibly nega-
tive), as a function of r. when he sees a.. Note that non-winning bid-
ders may have to pay a non-zero amount; if only the winner of the item
pays a non-zero amount, then this amount must be equal to p. (a.,r.)
divided by the probability of i winning, conditional on a and r..
Assume sufficient regularity of the function v.(a.,o_.) such that all
the integrals hereafter defined exist.
Finally, look at the problem for a specific bidder i. For con-
venience, drop the subscript "i" whenever no confusion results from
doing so. However, remember that all the functions in the model may
vary with i; in particular, the function p.(o*.,r. ) will be independent
of i only for models otherwise sufficiently symmetric.
Regret-Free Mechanisms:
This paper focuses on regret-free auction mechanisms. A mechanism
is said to be regret-free (for bidder i) if there exist, commonly
known, functions a, r, p, v, and F . and a constant a n satisfying the
following five conditions:
(1) The item goes to the j (possibly j = 0) with the largest a.
(ties with a„ are always broken in favor of the bid taker; other ties
occur with probability zero by assumption).
(2) The expected amount paid by i (averaged over all o_.) con-
ditional on a. and r. is p(cr,,r.) when a, > a., and zero when a. < a n .l i i i i 1—0
(3) The expected utility to i of participating in the auction if
he claims that his a. happens to equal x (when it really equals a.) is
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/ v(o\ ,a . )dF .(a . la. ,r . ) - p(x,r , ) ¥a., r. whenever x > a n . and
,
1 -l -l -i ' i l i l i
o £ x
is zero whenever x <^ a..
(4) / v(a i ,a_.)dF_i (a_i |a i ,r i ) -p(a.,r.)
a
.
< a
.
-l — i
> f v(a.,a .)dF .(a .|a.,r.) - p(x,r.) ¥ x, a., r.,
— *, i* -i -l-i'i'i r ' i ' i' i
a
. < x
-l —
(5) For each r., / v(o\,a . )dF .(a . |a.,r.) - p(a.,r.) isi Jx i -l -l -l ' i i 11
a
.
< a.
-l—i
non-negative if a. > a n . and is non-positve if a . < o_.° i r l—O
Now, examining these five conditions one by one, the first con-
dition requires that the item be awarded to the individual j with the
largest a.. If no bidder j has a a. strictly greater than a_, then
the bid taker keeps the item. In sufficiently symmetric models with
bidders whose strategies are monotonic functions of their a.'s, this
condition may be interpreted as awarding the item to the highest
bidder whenever the high bid exceeds the reservation price set by the
bid taker.
The second condition requires that a bidder i pay nothing whenever
his a. is less than or equal to o*; in other words, whenever i cannot
win the item regardless of others' bids. The third condition requires
that if i might possibly win the item, then his expected utility of
participating in the auction is equal to the expected value of the
item minus the expected price paid; in effect, this requires that
bidder i be risk neutral. If a. is less than or equal to a_, bidder i
is effectively excluded from participating in the auction, thus the
interpretation of a
n
as a screening level. If bidder i is screened
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from participating in the auction, his expected utility from the auc-
tion is zero.
While the first three conditions provided interpretations for
various notation, the remaining two conditions restrain the form of
the function p(a.,r.). In particular, the fourth condition requires
that bidder i, knowing his o. and having seen his r. could not have
increase his expected utility by pretending he had observed some dif-
ferent value for a.—a natural extension to our model of what Myerson
calls "incentive compatibility." Finally, the fifth condition basi-
cally requires that a bidder be screened from the auction if and only
if his expected utility would have been negative; Myerson calls this
"individual rationality."
The concept of regret mechanisms corresponds very closely to that
of Nash equilibria, with some important differences. Basically, to be
regret-free, the outcome of an auction must be such that no bidder
would have been able to gain by bidding differently had he had, at the
time of bidding, all the information on which payment depends. Clearly,
dominant strategy Nash equilibria are regre-free. Furthermore, any
Nash equilibria for an auction in which the amount paid by an indivi-
dual depends only on his own bid and on whether or not he wins the auc-
tioned object—this includes most auctions mechanisms actually used—is
also regret free. In addition, any Nash equilibrium for an instance of
competitive contracting in which the bid-taker must publically reveal,
shortly after awarding the contract, all information obtained from the
bids that is used in setting the terms of the contract, and in which
the winner may renegotiate the contract if and when he obtains infor-
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mation that would have led him to bid differently had he had it at the
time he bid will also be regret-free. However, non-dominant strategy
Nash equilibria for sealed bid auctions in which the price paid by the
winner also depends on non-winning bids—a common aspect of full bidder
surplus extracting mechanisms—will typically not be regret-free.
Prices Characterized:
The conditions of a regret-free mechanism clearly restrict how
p(a,,r ) may depend on o and r . . The following theorem states a
necessary restriction:
Theorem 1
For regret-free mechanisms, p(a.,r. ) =
/ v(a*,a_. )dF (a |a*,r.) + c (r.) for almost all r . Further-
a
-i 1 a i
more, if v(a
.
t o ,)dF .(a . |a.,r.) is continuous in a. at a.
* / i' -i -l -l ' l i l i
°-i < a i
equal to a_, then c. (r.) = 0.
Proof
/ v(a
1
,a_
i
)dF_
1
(a_
i
|a
i
,r
i
)
a
-i 1 a i
= E /
_ L L v(G i' a -i )dF-i,k (a -i,kl a i' r i> ak ) ] dF-i (akl a i' r i ) !x=a 1
ll
k^i a
k <
x °_
±ik
<o
k
Now, look at a fixed r. such that F. (a, a.,r. ) is dif ferentiable at
' i k k 1 i' i
a = a . In order that condition (4) holds, it is necessary that
-r—p(x,r. ) exists and is equal todx r i 'x= a M
tLd^ M / ^i.^> dF.i fk^.1>k k 1 .'1.V] dFk Cffkl ffi« rl ) lx-a/kM ak< xa-i,k<a k
i
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But, this last expression may be written as
* [ / v(V a-i )dF-i,k(a-i,k'VVV] dF(\K>Vlav = a/k* iCT
-i,k< ak k X
Therefore, pCa^i^) = I / / v ^ a
\!i
>
a^ dT-i^ a .±\ a \i * T ± ) + ci (r i )
k*i a, <a . a . , < a,k— 1 -l , k — k
which may be rewritten as
a
-i 1 a i
/ v(a*,a_i )dF_i (a_i |a*,r i ) + c^r^.
Now, / v(a i ,a_i )dF_i (a_i |a i ,r i )
-l — i
/ v(a*,a_.)dF_ i (a_1 |a*,r i ) - ^(r.)
a
.
< a
.
-l — i
must be (by condition (5)) non-negative for all a. > a_, and non-
positive for all a. <^ o~. But, if the first term of the last expres-
sion is continuous by hypothesis, then the entire expression must be
continuous in a, at a. equal to a_. Therefore the expression must
i l
total to zero at a^ e qua i to a~. Finally, since the first and second
terms cancel each other at a. equals a_, c. (r.) must be zero at r.
Repeating the above analysis for the almost all r. for which
F, has the required derivative gives the claimed result.
Note that in the extreme form of progressive auction for which
r.(a ) = a_. (i.e., the button auction of Milgrom and Weber), p(a.,r.)
equals v(a*,a_.) if a. exceeds a • the price is zero otherwise. In
this case, the information is such that p(a.,r.) may be interpreted as
the amount (no expectations needed) paid by i if he wins with a when
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the others' a.'s happen to be given by a_ . Here, the price happens to
be the value the item would have had to i had he had a a which were
tied to win the item. This result coincides with those previously
obtained by others for this particular auction.
In general, different bidders i will have the same function p.(a.,r.)
3 3 3
only if they also bave the same functions v. (a. .a .) and F. .(a .|a.,r.)
3 3-3 3 , -J -3 ' 3 3
Thus, asymmetric models typically result in asymmetric regret-free
mechanisms. As a result, in sufficiently asymmetric models, forcing
the bid taker to treat bidders symmetrically with regard to how the
amounts they pay is calculated may require awarding the item to some
bidder other than the bidder who values it most highly. (Vickrey
gives an example of an asymmetric model in which the equilibrium allo-
cation of the item may be non-Pareto optimal.)
The given form of p(a.,r.) is necessary, but may not be sufficient.
In particular, consider the following, symmetric, two bidder example:
a
1
and a are jointly, uniformly distributed in that band within the
unit square lying within some (small) e of the main diagonal. Let
v,{o. y o .) equal a. and let r.(a ,) equal a_. While it is clearlyii-i 1 1 -i J
possible to calculate the expression given above for p(a.,r.), we know
of no Nash equilibrium for this example.
Observe that the expected amount paid by a bidder depends on the
screening level a
n
through the quantity a*. In Myerson's work, and we
expect the same to be true here, the bid taker retains the item with
positive probability when he sets the screening level a„ to maximize
his expected revenue. However, in our model, the search for an opti-
mal o may be confounded by the ambiguity in how r ( au l v
_i) might vary
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with a
n
. For example, in actual progressive auctions, does i learn
about all others' a.'s, or only about those a.'s which exceed the
j J
screening level? Thus, the optimal screening level may depend on
rather specific details of the auction.
Our model does not explicitly include the possibility of a reser-
vation price; that is, the possibility that the highest bidder would
have a positive expected value for winning, but is none-the-less
screened from participating. Replacing the function c. (r.) by some
strictly smaller function would in effect create a situation similar
to that of a non-trivial reservation price. Clearly, as Milgrom and
Weber have already observed for three specific auctions, such a reser-
vation price reduces the bid taker's expected revenue below what it
would have been had the bid taker effected the same screening level
through, say, an appropriate entry fee paid by all bidders.
Effect of Information:
Having characterized the expected price paid by each bidder in
regret-free mechanisms, we will now use that characterization to study
the effect on the bid taker's expected revenue of changing how a bidder's
expected payment might depend on other bidder's information. First,
however, define a measure of information by defining r'.(a_.) to be a
refinement of r. (a .) if dF .(a . \a. ,r.) =
i -i -l -i ' i' i
/ dF ,(a . |a.,r' (t .))dF _,(t . |a.,r.) for all a. and r. (where wej
_i -i 1 i' i -i ' -i -i 1 i' i' i i
t-i
have badly abused the notation by failing to indicate that the form of
F . for r.(a .) may well differ from that for r'.(a .); the two foi
-i i -i J l -i ' >rms
need not even have the same domain!). For example, r'.(a ) = a* is a
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refinement of r.(cr ) = a,., and r'(a_ ) = a is a refinement of any
other r. (cr .)• Now, the following theorem gives necessary conditions
such that the more refined the information r. by the auction, the
higher the bid taker's expected revenue.
Theorem 2
If (a) r'(o"_.) is a refinement of r(a_„);
(b) / v(a*,a_. )dF (a_. |a*,r'(t_. )) is a non-decreasing
a_i < <J±
function of each t., j*0 or i;
(c) a'. ' a. implies that
dF ,(a . |a.,r.) < dF .(a . |a.',r.)
-i -l ' V l — -l -l ' l ' i
for all a
.
and all r
.
;
-l i
(d) via . .a .)dF .(a
.
|a.,r.) is a continuous function of
> l-i -l -i ' l l
a_i < a ±
a. at a . equal to o~ and for amost all r
.
;
then, on average, i will pay at least as much in any regret-free mecha-
nism with the more refined revealed information r'(a_ ) than on any
regret-free mechanism with the less refined revealed information r(a_.).
Proof :
For fixed a. and almost every fixed r., Theorem 1 together with
condition (d) give that the expected payment by bidder i In a regret-
free mechanism with reveal information function r'(o_.) is equal to
/ / v(a*,a_ i )dF_ i (a_.|a*,r'(t_ i ))dF_ i (t_ i |a i ,r i ).
t . a . < a.
-i -l—i
But, conditions (b) and (c) make this at least as large as
-15-
/ /. v(a*,a_i )dF_i (a_i |a*,r
, (t_
i
))dF_
i
(t_
i
|a*,r.)
t . a . < a.
-l -l — i
This may be rewritten as
/ v(o*,o_
± )f
dF_
i
(a_
i
|a*,r'(t_
i
))dF_
1
(t_
i
|a*
>
r.)
a . < a. t
-l—i -i
which reduces to
/ -v(o*,o ,)dF .(a . |a*,r.)j '
-i 7 -i -i ' i
a
-i <
CT
i
by using the definition of refinement. However, this last expression
equals the expected payment by bidder i in any regret-free mechanism
with revealed information function r(a_.), thereby establishing the
claimed result.
The theorem's conclusion depends on four conditions. First, we
can only compare the effect of two different types of revealed infor-
mation if one type is a refinement of the other. Roughly speaking,
the second and third conditions require that bidders' signals be posi-
tively correlated with each other and with the item's price or value.
More precisely, the second condition requires that the larger other
bidders' signals, the larger the expected price paid by a bidder; the
third condition requires that the larger one bidder's signal, the
larger other bidders' signals tend to be. Finally, the fourth con-
dition assures a unique characterization of the regret-free price
function; without the continuity required by this condition, there may
be several regret-free mechanisms which differ only in their price
functions.
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We do not state separate conditions on the value function and the
probability distributions such that condition (b) will be satisfied,
mainly because to do so, we would most likely have to severely
restrict the possible forms of the information statistic r.. However,
if r(a_. ) merely consists of upper and lower bounds (possibly infinite)
on the components of cr_., then the assumptions of Milgrom and Weber's
model appear to imply our theorem's conditions. (Note: The previously
mentioned example, for which we know of no regret-free mechanisms, does
not satisfy Milgrom and Weber's assumptions; the signals are not
affiliated.) Thus, our results appear to hold for at least as broad a
class of auctions as any previous work.
Observe that if the distribution of cr . were independent of a.
then condition (c) would hold with equality and both types of revealed
information would give the same expected price. Since any type of
revealed information is a refinement of no revealed information, all
regret-free mechanisms satisfying condition (d) result in the same
expected price. Thus, the equivalence result derived by Myerson for
the case of statistically independent values in fact holds for all
sufficiently regular auctions with statistically independent infor-
mation.
Conclusion:
This paper's approach to modelling auctions differs from others'
works in two major aspects. First, the model includes a parameter
describing what the auction reveals to a bidder about other bidders'
information in the process of their bidding. Therefore, the model
-17-
includes a wide variety of auction mechanisms; auction mechanisms
differ in what information they reveal about bidders during the
bidding process. Second, we define the concept of regret-free mech-
anisms. While regret-free mechanisms in general correspond to special
cases of Nash equilibria, the class of regret-free mechanisms seems to
include many, if not most, auction mechanisms observed in practice.
This model allows us to derive the functional relation of the
expected price paid by each bidder on the specified minimal statistic
of other bidders' information. This result encompasses many previous
characterizations of Nash equilibria derived for specific auction
mechanisms. This result also paves the way for our second theorem,
namely, that under quite general conditions, the more refined the
revealed information, the higher the expected amount paid by each
bidder. The second theorem not only encompasses a variety of previous
results on the benefits to be obtained by the bid taker from revealing
information, but, in effect, defines a large family of auction mech-
anisms within which the button auction of Milgrom and Weber gives at
least as high an expected revenue to the bid taker as any other mech-
anism. Taken together, the concept of regret-free mechanisms and the
example results show the potential our model has for better under-
standing the role of information in optimal auction mechanisms.
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